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Effort Maximization in Asymmetric 





This paper provides existence and characterization of the optimal contest success function 
under the condition that the objective of the contest designer is total effort maximization 
among n heterogeneous players. Heterogeneity of players makes active participation of a 
player in equilibrium endogenous with respect to the specific contest success function adopted 
by the contest designer. Hence, the aim of effort maximization implies the identification of 
those players who should be excluded from making positive efforts. We give a general proof 
for the existence of an optimal contest success function and provide an algorithm for the 
determination of the set of actively participating players. This is turn allows to determine 
optimal efforts in closed form. An important general feature of the solution is that 
maximization of total effort requires at least three players to be active. 
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July 27, 2009 1 Introduction
Competitive social situations are frequently modeled as contest games where contestants com-
pete for a ﬁxed prize by exerting eort which increases their chances to win the prize. The
prominent application in this literature is rent-seeking which was introduced by Tullock in his
seminal paper [18]. Based on this framework an extensive literature followed, compare Congle-
ton et al. [4] for a collection of related works. Moreover, this framework is also successfully
applied in dierent contexts, like conﬂict, lobbying, patent races, sports tournaments, etc., see
Konrad [9] for a recent survey.
An important question in this literature is related with the aggregated eort level that is ex-
ertedbycontestantsinequilibrium. Iftheobjectiveofthecontestdesigneriseortmaximization,
as suggested by the mentioned examples, then the optimal design of the contest becomes cru-
cial, see for instance, Gradstein and Konrad [8] for the optimal number of stages in multistage
contests, Amegashie [1] for the optimal seeding of contestants, and Dasgupta and Nti [6] for the
optimalcontestrule. Thisliteratureisbasedontheassumptionthatcontestantsarehomogeneous,
or that there are only two contestants. While Dasgupta and Nti [6] search for the optimal contest
success function for n identical contestants, Nti [12] does so for two heterogeneous players.
Heterogeneity aects aggregated equilibrium eort because contestants with low valuation
will exert less eort to win the less valued prize. This is anticipated by contestants with higher
valuation such that overall eort in equilibrium is relatively low. In these cases the design of the
contest rule, or contest success function, is of importance because balancing the heterogeneity
by biasing the contest success function in favor of weak players might induce higher aggregated
equilibrium eort in comparison to an unbiased contest success function.
Extending this analysis to contest games with more than two heterogeneous players is far
from obvious. This is due to the fact that favoring very weak players might be too costly because
the incentives of strong players are distorted as well such that overall equilibrium eort might be
decreased. Hence, it might be proﬁtable to exclude speciﬁc contestants, a question which cannot
arise in the two-player case studied by Nti [12].
The analysis of the n-player case is the focus of our study, i.e., our objective is to determine
the optimal contest success function that induces maximal aggregated equilibrium eort among
n heterogeneous contestants. From a technical perspective this extension is not trivial because in
the n-player contest the equilibrium is usually not interior, i.e., there are contestants that prefer
to remain inactive, see Stein [16]. The set of active contestants depends on the distribution of
the heterogeneous parameters but also on the respective contest success function. Hence, the
derivation of the optimally designed contest success function is a complex issue because not
only individual eort is aected by this contest rule but also the set of active contestants which
has an additional impact on equilibrium eort.
However, our results for the n-player contest game are straightforward: We can show that
there exists an optimal contest rule that maximizes aggregated equilibrium eort given the dis-
tribution of heterogeneous cost parameters and valuations. As in the two-player contest, weak
players are favored, however, not all contestants will be active. The crucial step in the analysis
is the characterization of the optimal set of active contestants. We provide an algorithm that
describes how this subset is determined for a given distribution of player characteristics and dis-
1cuss its properties based on numerical examples. Once this set is uncovered, the speciﬁcation
of the optimal contest success function follows automatically. An important by-product of this
algorithmic construction is the result that at least three players are active in the eort maximizing
equilibrium, if n > 2 holds. Hence, the asymmetric two-player case and its solution properties
turn out to be special and do not generalize to more than two asymmetric contestants.
Biased contest rules are clearly relevant in practical applications. For instance, bid prefer-
ences in public procurement auctions, armative action policies in selection tournaments, biased
rules in sport tournaments in order to restore competitive balancedness, and political, e.g. na-
tional biases in international trade provide rich examples.
From a mathematical point of view, the problem we are dealing with in this paper is a bilevel
program or, more precisely, a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints. The latter is
of the general form
max
x;
f(x;) subject to x 2 S();
where x; denote the variables and S() is the solution set of another optimization or (Nash)
equilibrium problem, typically called the lower-level problem, cf. Luo et al. [10], Outrara et al.
[14], Dempe [7] and references therein for an extensive discussion. Note that this lower level
problem depends on . In our case, the lower level problem is the contest game and has a unique
solution x() (depending on ) for which also an analytic expression is known. This allows us
to follow the so-called implicit programming approach from [13, 14] and to replace the unkown
x in the objective function f by the unique solution x() of the lower level problem. We then
obtain an unconstrained (but typically nonsmooth) optimization problem
max

˜ f() := f(x();)
depending on  only. Standard solvers for the solution of such a kind of (usually nonconcave)
optimization problem ﬁnd local maxima or certain stationary points of the objective function,
but not necessarily a global maximum. Here we exploit the special structure of our eort max-
imization problem in order to derive a very simple algorithm for the computation of a global
maximum.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we introduce our
n-player contest game with heterogeneous players. The contest game is based on a contest suc-
cess function (CSF) with weighted eorts that is a simpliﬁed version of an asymmetric CSF as
axiomatized in Clark and Riis [3]. We derive some properties of the equilibrium in the under-
lying contest game that are helpful for the subsequent analysis in Section 2. In Section 3 we
prove that there exists a vector of weighting factors that yields a global maximum for aggregated
equilibrium eort. In Section 4 we present an algorithm to characterize the optimal set of active
contestants that determines the optimal set of weighting factors.
Notation: x 2 R denotes the variable of player , x := (x1;:::; xn) is the vector of all
decision variables. In order to emphasize the role of player  within this vector, we sometimes
write x = (x; x ), where the symbol x  subsumes the variables of all other players. We further
denote by B(x;) the Euclidian ball of radius  > 0 around a given point x 2 Rn.
22 The Underlying Contest Game
The contest game to be considered here is a special instance of a Nash equilibrium problem and









=1 x   x; if x , 0;
0; if x = 0
be the expected payo or utility of player  2 N, where ; are positive constants for all  2 N
which are assumed to be ﬁxed throughout this section. Then each player  2 N chooses a strategy







holds for all  2 N, i.e. player  tries to maximize his utility function  with respect to his own
strategy x, whereas the strategies of all other players are ﬁxed (at their optimal values).
The utility functions  can be interpreted in the following way: All players take part in
a lottery, where a price with the value V = 1 can be won. Every player  can increase his
probability of winning, which is given by the contest success function
x
Pn
=1 x, by increasing his
eort x, but he has to have in mind that this also increases his costs x. We could extend our
model to the case where dierent players have dierent valuations V > 0 of the price. This









=1 xV   ˜ x; if x , 0;
0; if x = 0:
In this case, we can obtain utility functions of the form  by multiplying the functions ˜  with
the factor 1
V and deﬁning  :=
˜ 
V. Note that re-scaling the function ˜ (; x; ) with a positive
multiplier does not change the location of its maximum, i.e. it does not change the optimal eort
x;. Hence, the case of inhomogeneous valuations of the price is included in our model.
We now summarize a number of properties of this Nash equilibrium problem. The following
existence and uniqueness result for the above problem was established in Cornes and Hartley [5],
Szidarovsky and Okuguchi [17], and Stein [16].
Theorem 2.1 The above Nash equilibrium problem has a unique solution x.
Note that the previous result holds for any ﬁxed parameters  and , but that, of course, the
solution depends on the exact values of these parameters. More precisely, we have the following
representation, see Cornes and Hartley [5] and Stein [16] for a proof of these statements.
Theorem 2.2 Let x be the unique solution of the above equilibrium problem, let K := f 2 N j
x; > 0g be the corresponding set of active players, and let k := jKj the number of active players.
Then:
(a) K consists of at least two elements.
3(b) The active players can be characterized as follows:
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> > > ;
for all  2 N.
Theorem 2.2 characterizes the equilibrium based on an implicit description of the set K of active
players in (1). It should be noted that also the expression for the unique solution x of the Nash




v. Hence, the following result due to Stein [16] allows an explicit
calculation of the set K. Together with Theorem 2.2, we are then in a position to compute the
unique solution of our Nash equilibrium problem.










Furthermore, let x be the unique solution of the Nash equilibrium problem. Then the corre-
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A simple consequence of the previous result is the following corollary that will be used later in
the proof of Lemma A.1.
Corollary 2.4 Assume without loss of generality that the players  are ordered as in (2). Let x
































for  = 3;:::;k;
4from Theorem 2.3. 
Note that the inclusion in this corollary can be an equality but, in general, will be a strict inclusion
as the following example illustrates.
Example 2.5 Consider a game with four players and  = (1;1;1;1)T.
(a) If  = (2;3;3:5;4)T, we have
K = f1;2;3;4g =
(
 2 N












(b) If, however,  = (2;3;3:5;4:5)T, we have
K = f1;2;3g $ f1;2;3;4g =
(
 2 N













We next provide a characterization of the unique Nash equilibrium in terms of the subsets K  N.
This characterization will turn out to be useful for our analysis in the subsequent sections.
Theorem 2.6 Let L; M  N be subsets with l := jLj  2, m := jMj  2, and the property that
0








()  2 L
1
C C C C C C A and
0








()  2 M
1
C C C C C C A:
Then L = M, hence the index set of active players corresponding to the unique Nash equilibrium
is the only subset of N with the properties mentioned above.
Proof. Let x be the unique Nash equilibrium. Then we know from Theorem 2.2 (a), (b), that
the index set of active players
K := f 2 N j x
; > 0g
has the postulated properties. Hence we only have to verify that L = M follows for all sets
L; M  N with these properties. Assume now that there are two such sets with L , M. If we
assume without loss of generality that the players are ordered according to (2), this implies
L = f1;:::;lg and M = f1;:::;mg:
Since L , M, we can assume without loss of generality that l > m. Then l < M, and together




= (l   m)
l
l



















5a contradiction to l 2 L. Consequently, we have L = M. 
We summarize the previous results in the following note which, basically, says that we have a
Nash equilibrium if and only if we are able to ﬁnd a set K satisfying the requirements (a) and (b)
from Theorem 2.2.
Remark 2.7 The following statements hold:
(a) If x is the unique Nash equilibrium and K the corresponding set of active players, then K
has at least two elements and satisﬁes the conditions from (1).
(b) Conversely, if we have a subset K  N with at least two elements such that (1) holds, then
K is the set of active players corresponding to the unique Nash equilibrium of our game.
3 Eort Maximization: Existence of Solution
We consider once again the Nash equilibrium problem from Section 2. Recall that this problem
depends on two sets of parameters ; which were assumed to be positive. For the rest of this
paper, we still view the parameters  > 0 as being ﬁxed, whereas the parameters  > 0 will
be viewed as variables. Since the unique solution x depends on  (and  which, however, are
ﬁxed), we now write x() for this solution as well as K() for the corresponding set of active
players. Moreover, let k() := jK()j be the number of active players. In view of Theorem 2.2,
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> > > ;
8 2 N;
whereas the characterization











holds for the set K().





() s.t.  2 (0;1)
n: (4)
Recall that x() is the (Nash) equilibrium eort of player ,  = 1;::;n, if the contest success
function uses the vector of weights . A contest administrator - or more general, mechanism
designer - can now mediate the contest by choice of the weights  in order to elicit maximal total
eort from the n potential contestants (some of whom may choose to stay inactive). Hence, it is
the contest designer’s problem that is described by (4). Note also that the -parameters describe
6personal characteristics of the contestants, which consequently cannot be altered neither by the
contestants themselves nor the contest designer.
Taking into account the previous representation of x(), the objective function of (4) can be

































C C C C C C C A: (5)
The aim of this section is to show that the maximization problem (4) has a solution. This is not
clear a priori since the feasible set for  is both unbounded and open. The unboundedness turns
out to be less serious (and will be dealt with in Lemma 3.1), the really crucial part is the fact that
the objective function f is not deﬁned as soon as  = 0 for one player .
We begin with some results to show that both f() and K() remain unchanged under certain
manipulations of . A ﬁrst result of this kind is the following lemma which shows that both f()
and K() are homogeneous of degree zero in . This is not surprising since the utility functions
 themselves are homogeneous of degree zero in , but the lemma can also be proven directly
using the deﬁnitions of f() and K().
Lemma 3.1 For all  2 (0;1)n and all c > 0, we have
K(c) = K() and f(c) = f():
Proof. First note that c is feasible (i.e., belongs to (0;1)n) for all feasible . The characteri-
zation (3) together with the uniqueness of the set K() by Remark 2.7 then immediately implies
K(c) = K(). Taking this into account and calculating f(c) gives precisely the same value as
f() since the factor c can be cancelled. 
Another manipulation of  which leaves the function value f() unchanged is presented in the
following result which basically says that, given a ﬁxed parameter , we can replace the compo-
nents 
 of  corresponding to the inactive players by arbitrary small numbers  and still have
K() = K() and f() = f().
Lemma 3.2 Let  2 (0;1)n be arbitrarily given. Then K() = K() and f() = f() hold
for all  2 (0;1)n satisfying the following properties:




(b) For all  < K(), we have
 2
0








7 7 7 7 7 7 7 5:
7Proof. Choose  2 (0;1)n in such a way that the two properties (a) and (b) hold. Then Remark
2.7 shows that the corresponding index set K() is uniquely deﬁned. Using property (a), we











































The uniqueness of K() therefore gives K() = K(). Together with property (a) we then obtain
f() = f(). 
So far, we are not able to prove the existence of a solution for the maximization problem (4).
However, Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 show that such a solution (if it exists) is certainly not unique.
In order to verify the existence of a solution, we ﬁrst verify the continuity of the function f on
(0;1)n. Note that this continuity is not completely obvious since the index set K() may change
in points arbitrarily close to .
Theorem 3.3 The objective function f is continuous on (0;1)n. Moreover, this function is con-

















Proof. The statement regarding the continuous dierentiability is clear since condition (6)
guarantees that, locally, the index set K() is constant, hence K() = K() for all  from a
suciently small neighbourhood of . In particular, f is continuous in these points.
In order to verify the continuity of f on the whole set (0;1)n, it therefore remains to consider
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is nonempty. Now, it is not dicult to see that there is a neighbourhood U  (0;1)n of  such
that
K  K()  K [ L 8 2 U;
where, for simplicity of notation, we use the abbreviation K := K(). Let us further write
k := jKj und l := jLj. Then, for each  2 U, we have K() = M for one of the 2l sets M satisfying
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3
























































C C C C C C C C C A
3
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 5
= f(
):
Since the 2l functions fM are continuous in , we obtain for an arbitrary " > 0 and all M a
suitable M > 0 such that jfM()   fM()j < " for all  2 B(;M). Deﬁne  := minfM j K 
M  K [ Lg. Then we obtain for all  2 B(;) that K() = M for one of the above index sets
M and, therefore,   f()   f(
)
   =
  fM()   fM(
)
   < ":
This proves continuity of f in . 
So far, we know that f is continuous on (0;1)n. However, this set is still unbounded and open.
Based on the following argument the problem of unboundedness becomes irrelevant in our con-













> > : 2 (0;1)
n






> > ;; (7)
we obtain f ((0;1)n) = f(A), and the function f attains a global maximum on (0;1)n if and only
if it has a maximizer on the bounded set A. But this set A is still not closed, hence not compact.
However, Theorem 3.4 below shows that the function f can be extended continuously onto the
9closure ¯ A of A. This continuous extension of f then attains a maximum on ¯ A by a standard
compactness argument. We then show that this, in turn, implies the existence of a maximizer of
f on its original domain (0;1)n.
In order to simplify our notation, let us deﬁne the index set
J() := f 2 N j  = 0g
corresponding to a given  2 [0;1)n. Then the following existence result holds.
Theorem 3.4 The function f : A ! R has a continuous extension onto the closure ¯ A of A and,
therefore, attains a global maximum on ¯ A. Moreover, no vector  2 ¯ A with jJ()j = n   1 is a
global maximum.
Proof. The fact that f can be continuously extended from A onto ¯ A follows from Lemmas A.1
and A.2 in the appendix, where, in particular, it is shown that this extension satisﬁes f() = 0
for all  2 ¯ A with jJ()j = n   1, hence none of these vectors is a global maximum of f since f
attains positive values on A. The existence of a global maximum then follows immediately from
the fact that ¯ A is a compact set. 
The global maximizer from Theorem 3.4 might belong to the set ¯ AnA. However, the feasible set
of our original maximization problem is the set A or (without scaling) the set (0;1)n. Using a
suitable scaling together with a small perturbation, we now obtain the existence of a maximizer
for our original problem from (4). Note that the following result shows that we can choose the
maximizer in such a way that it also has some additional dierentiability properties that will be
exploited in Section 4.
Corollary 3.5 The function f attains a global maximum in (0;1)n. Moreover, this global maxi-
mum can be chosen in such a way that condition (6) from Theorem 3.3 holds.
Proof. By Theorem 3.4, the function f attains a global maximum in ¯ A, and this maximum
necessarily belongs to the set
f 2 ¯ A j jJ()j 2 f0;:::;n   2gg:
However, as a consequence of Lemma 3.1, we have f(c) = f() for all  from this set and for
all scalars c > 0. Consequently, the function f attains a global maximum  on the set
f 2 [0;1)
n j jJ()j 2 f0;:::;n   2gg:
If, for this maximum, we have jJ()j 2 f1;:::;n   2g, i.e.  < (0;1)n, Lemma 3.2 shows that
there is a point  2 (0;1)n with the same function value so that  is also a global maximizer.
Consequently, f has a global maximum in the set (0;1)n, too. If this maximum does not satisfy
condition (6) from Theorem 3.3, we can apply Lemma 3.2 once more and get another point in
(0;1)n with the same function value (which, therefore, is also a maximum) such that (6) holds. 
104 Eort Maximization: Computation of Solution
Corollary 3.5 shows that there exists at least one global maximum  of the optimization problem
from (4). Moreover, this result tells us that the maximum can be chosen in such a way that the
objective function f is dierentiable in a neighbourhood of this maximum. Since the feasible set
(0;1)n is open, it follows that each such maximizer satisﬁes rf() = 0 .
Basically, the aim of this section is to compute a global maximum by looking for all possible
solutions of the nonlinear system of equations rf() = 0 at those points x where the deriva-
tive of f exists. The previous discussion shows that this technique will eventually provide us
a global maximum of (4). Moreover, our derivation will result in a particular algorithm for the
computation of such a global maximum.
Unfortunately, computing the zeros of rf() = 0 is not an easy task, especially since the
derivative with respect to  leads to complicated formulas. In order to simplify our calculations,





for all  2 N. Since  2 (0;1)n, the mapping  is a dieomorphism from (0;1)n onto (0;1)n.
We further write  =

 for the vector whose components are given by

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with k() := jK()j. Using Theorem 2.1, it follows that for each  2 (0;1)n, there is precisely





















C C C C C C A:
Since
K(()) = K()
for all  2 (0;1)n, we have g = f   1. Hence, for all global maxima  of the function f
satisfying condition (6) of Theorem 3.3, the function g has a global maximum in  :=

 and is

























 8 < K(
):

















 is a global maximum of f such that condition (6) of Theorem 3.3 holds. Hence we
have the following result.
11Lemma 4.1  2 (0;1)n is a global maximum of f satisfying property (6) of Theorem 3.3 if and
only if  =

 is a global maximum of g satisfying condition (9).
Consequently, if we ﬁnd all global maxima of g satisfying (9), then a simple re-transformation
gives us all the global maxima of f satisfying condition (6) from Theorem 3.3.
If a global maximum  satisﬁes (9), then there is a neighbourhood of  such that K() 
K() for all  from this neighbourhood and, hence, g is continuously dierentiable in this neigh-
bourhood. Since  is a maximum, we therefore have rg() = 0. Consequently, we have to
compute the zeros of rg. To this end, we ﬁrst state two simple properties of the function g whose
analogues were already shown for the function f.
Lemma 4.2 (a) For all  2 (0;1)n and all c > 0, we have K() = K(c) and g() = g(c).




 8 2 K(







 8 < K(
):
Lemma 4.2 shows that it suces to compute maxima  of g such that
P
2K() 
 = 1. The fol-
lowing result summarizes some properties of global maxima satisfying this additional condition.




and (9). Then the following statements hold:
















































7 7 7 7 7 7 5:
12Proof. Since the maximum  satisﬁes condition (9), there is a neighbourhood U of  with
K() = K(
) =: K and k() = k(
) =: k:
Hence g is continuously dierentiable in this neighbourhood of  and, therefore, being an (es-
sentially unconstrained) global maximum, we have rg() = 0.














This shows that statement (b) holds.
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1
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C C C C C C A:














































7 7 7 7 7 7 5:
Consequently, the vector 
K := (
)2K is a solution of the linear system of equations
0

























C C C C C A
2K
:
Using the abbreviations K := ()2K and  1
K := ( 1

















13This matrix M is singular, more precisely, it has rank k  1 and its null space (kernel) is given by
ker(M) = spanfKg (this singularity reﬂects the fact that the function value g() is independent
of the scaling of , cf. Lemma 4.2, hence M cannot be expected to be nonsingular at an arbitrary
stationary point). Now it is easy to see that one particular solution of the above linear system of













C C C C C A 8 2 K:
Therefore, the vector 
K is of the form 


































for all  2 K. Hence statement (a) holds.












This veriﬁes statement (c). Inserting the representation of 
K gives the desired representation of
g() from assertion (d). 
Based on Theorem 4.3 (a) a re-transformation of 














which is clearly increasing in . This implies that in a global maximum players with high costs
are favored relatively more than players with low costs. For a global maximum the heterogeneity
between active players is therefore reduced. A closer look at the formula from Theorem 4.3 (a)


















is also increasing in , whenever there are more than two players active in the optimum. We will
show in Theorem 4.9 that this condition is met for all sets N consisting of more than two players.
Hence, the 2-player-case is the only one in which heterogeneity between the active players is
totally removed.









is violated for all  < K(). The next lemma shows that, in some sense, the converse of Theorem
4.3 also holds.
Lemma 4.4 Let K  N be arbitrarily given, let k := jKj  2 and suppose that
(k   2) <
X
2K
 8 2 K: (12)
Deﬁne the vector  2 (0;1)n in such a way that 
 > 1

















(b) K() = K and  satisﬁes condition (9).
(c) The function g is continuously dierentiable in a neighbourhood of  with rg() = 0.











Proof. Statement (a) can be veriﬁed easily using the deﬁnition of 
 for  2 K. Assertions (c)
and (d), on the other hand, follow in essentially the same way as in the proof of Theorem 4.3
since our deﬁnition of 
 is exactly the same as the representation of 
 obtained in Theorem 4.3
for 








 = 1 ()  2 K: (13)
The deﬁnition of the index set K() together with the uniqueness of this index set then shows
K = K(). Now, for  2 K, we obtain from the deﬁnition of 


















hence the implication “(=” holds in (13). On the other hand, for  < K, we have (k   1)
 > 1
which, by contraposition, shows that also the implication “=)” holds in (13). 
Lemma4.4andTheorem4.3arethefoundationofthefollowingalgorithmforthecomputationof
all global maxima that satisfy the additional conditions from Theorem 4.3. Using the variations
15from Lemma 4.2, we obtain all global maxima of g in (0;1)n since each global maximum can
be modiﬁed by these variations in such a form that the conditions from Theorem 4.3 hold.
For a better understanding of our algorithm, note that Theorem 4.3 allows the following inter-
pretation: If  is a global maximum of g satisfying
P
2K() 
 = 1 and (9), then we necessarily
have
jK(








 8 2 K(
)
by statement (c). (Assertions (a) and (b) only give the structure of the maximizer , whereas
statement (d) calculates the corresponding function value g().) Now, Lemma 4.4 takes an
arbitrary index set K  N with
k := jKj  2 and (k   2) <
X
2K
 8 2 K; (14)
deﬁnes corresponding values for 





 = 1 as well as condition (9). Note that there are only ﬁnitely many
index sets K  N with (14), hence we necessarily get a global maximum among these candidate
points by comparing the corresponding function values g(). Since the  are speciﬁed by the
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for all K  N with k := jKj  2 and (k 2) <
P
2K  for all  2 K. We next state our algorithm
formally.
Algorithm 4.5 (S.0) Set hmax := 0 and L := ;.
(S.1) Check for all K  N with k := jKj  2 and (k   2) <
P
2K  for all  2 K the following
conditions:
(a) If h(K) > hmax, then set hmax = h(K) and L = fKg.
(b) If h(K) = hmax, then set L = L [ fKg.
Basically, Algorithm 4.5 compares all sets K that could belong to a global maximum and re-
members those with the highest value h(K) found so far. In the end, the set L contains all sets K
such that the corresponding vector  from Lemma 4.4 is a global maximum. This procedure is
completely justiﬁed by Theorem 4.3 and Lemma 4.4. Via the transformation (8), we then obtain
a solution 
 := =
 of the original eort maximization problem from (4). Recall, however,
that the solution of (4) is always nonunique, and that any positive multiple of  is also a solution
of the eort maximization game.
Note that Algorithm 4.5 reduces the original maximization problem (4), where the maximiza-
tion is taken over inﬁnitely many values  2 (0;1)n, to a ﬁnite procedure over certain subsets
K of N. In the worst case, the number of subsets that have to be checked in Algorithm 4.5 is
16large, depending exponentially on the number of players, but in practice it seems to work very
eciently at least for n  25.
Now, we want to apply our results to two special cases that have already been discussed in
the literature, cf. Nti [12], Dasgupta and Nti [6].
Example 4.6 In the 2-player case, the set of active players in the global maximum is K = f1;2g












 = 2 8 = 1;2:
Therefore, heterogeneity between the players is completely removed in the optimum. The opti-

















The complete removal of heterogeneity is also reﬂected by the fact that expected payo in equi-
librium is identical for both players. ^
Example 4.7 In the homogeneous n-player case, where  =  (=: ) for all ; 2 N, all subsets
K  N with k := jKj  2 are feasible for Algorithm 4.5 and the set of active players in the global



















Thus, the set of active players in the global maximum is K = N, and Theorem 4.3 shows that the












 = n 8 2 N:













n2 8 2 N:
^
As we mentioned above, the number of subsets that have to be checked in Algorithm 4.5 can be
quite large. It is, however, possible to restrict the candidates for L further. This follows from the
subsequent result.
17Proposition 4.8 Let K; M  N be feasible subsets for Algorithm 4.5, i.e., let k := jKj  2;m :=
jMj  2, and suppose that
(k   2) <
X
2K
 8 2 K and (m   2) <
X
2M
 8 2 M:
Then, if M $ K, we have h(M) < h(K).
Proof. Using the well-known inequality between the arithmetic and harmonic mean together
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 0;

















Since all  ( 2 KnM) are positive, the harmonic mean and the arithmetic mean coincide if and
only if all  ( 2 KnM) coincide, i.e. if  =  for all  2 KnM and a suitable  > 0. Hence, the
second equation implies that, for all  2 KnM, we have










which, however, is a contradiction to the feasibility of K for Algorithm 4.5. 
Proposition 4.8 says that strict subsets of feasible sets for Algorithm 4.5 cannot be optimal. Thus,
all elements of K 2 L have to be “maximal” subsets of N.
Now, consider the case of N  3 players. Further note that every subset M  N consisting
of two players is feasible for Algorithm 4.5. Then, take an arbitary element  2 NnM and deﬁne
K := M [ fg. The so deﬁned set K consists of three players containing M as a strict subset and
is feasible for Algorithm 4.5. In view of Proposition 4.8, it follows that M cannot be an optimal
set. Hence we obtain the following result.
Theorem 4.9 Consider the eort maximization problem (4) with jNj  3. Then there are at least
three active players in every solution K 2 L.
18Note that the previous argument cannot be used in order to show that four or more players will
be active at a solution of the maximization problem (4). In fact, Example 4.12 below shows that
there exist instances of our problem with precisely three players being active in the optimum,
hence, from this point of view, Theorem 4.9 is optimal. The last Theorem is remarkable: it not
only improves on previous knowledge as summarized in Theorem 2:2 (a); it is also in marked
contrast to well-established results from contests, which are modeled as all-pay auctions; i.e. the
contest success function is such that the highest eort wins with certainty (in case of m highest
bids each wins with probability 1
m). Then the equilibrium of the n-player complete information
contest is generically unique and exhibits precisely two active players. Moreover, in the non-
generic case with multiple equilibria, total eort in equilibrium is highest in the equilibrium with
only two active players (see Baye et al. [2]). Hence allowing for free entry into the contest cannot
improve the competitiveness of the contest as the equilibrium strategies of the two active players
do not depend on the number and identity of inactive players. This is not true in our model: a
third player can always improve on the eort levels obtained in a two-player contest from the
contest designer’s point of view.
Exploiting Theorem 4.9, we are now able to give an analytic solution also for the case of
three players. In particular, the optimality of evenness (Example 4:6) only applies to two-player
contests.
Example 4.10 In the 3-player case, Theorem 4.9 shows that the set of active players in the global
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 1
8 = 1;2;3:
Hence, heterogeneity between the players is not completely removed in the optimum, but is
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19One can prove analoguously to Theorem 2.6 that for all  there is at most one subset of N
satisfying this condition. Conversely, a simple calculation shows that there is always at least one
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Numerical tests indicate the following conjecture:
Conjecture 4.11 For every , the set L generated by Algorithm 4.5 is L = fKg, hence K is the
unique set such that the corresponding vector  from Lemma 4.4 is a global maximum.
Finally, let us consider some (nontrivial) examples.
Example 4.12 We applied Algorithm 4.5 to dierent instances of our eort maximization prob-
lem from (4). To this end, we consider problems with 7 players and take dierent values for
the parameters . Table 1 contains the precise values for  together with the optimal set L
computed by our method. The corresponding values of the solution  are calculated using (11)
for the active players. For the inactive players, the maximal possible values of 
 according to
Theorem 4.3 are given. In the last column, the total eort f() is given. Note that, in all the
instances computed in Table 1 as well as in many further calculations that we did (with up to 25
players), our conjecture holds. ^
 L  f()
(1;23;33;43;53;63;73) f(1;2;3)g (3:8919;26:1818;61:7143;128;250;432;686) 0:2836
(1;22;32;42;52;62;72) f(1;2;3)g (3:7¯ 3;12:¯ 4;21:9130;32;50;72;98) 0:3224
(1;2;3;4;5;6;7) f(1;2;3;4)g (5;8:5714;11:25;13:¯ 3;15;18;21) 0:4208









































Table 1: Numerical illustration of Algorithm 4.5
5 Final Remarks
We have analyzed contest games with players characterized by heterogeneous valuations as well
as heterogeneous cost functions, which are based on asymmetric variants of the arguably most
popular contest success function in the literature: Tullock’s [17] lottery model, which deter-
mines a contestant’s success probability to be equal to the ratio of his eort and total eorts.
20These variants apply weight biases to the individual eorts in the original Tullock speciﬁcation.
We summarize known existence results and further develop equilibrium characterizations in or-
der to address the general problem of total eort maximization from a contest designer’s point
of view, who has control over the bias weights; i.e., the choice of the contest success function.
The designer’s choice of the optimal contest success function leads to a nonsmooth optimization
problem as the number of contestants contributing to total eorts is endogenous and depends on
the weights (given valuation and cost parameters). Nevertheless, we are able to show that an op-
timal contest success function always exists; i.e., for any given distribution of valuation and cost
parameters there is a solution to the contest designer’s problem. Moreover, this solution is easily
computable once the set of active players in the eort maximizing equilibrium is determined.
The latter is the crucial task; i.e., we infer the optimal contest success function from the set of
in the eort maximizing equilibrium active players, not vice versa. The determination of this
set of players is a ﬁnite search problem, which can be solved algorithmically. It is shown that
our algorithm cannot end at a set containing only two players; hence the optimal contest success
function always activates at least three players in the total eorts maximizing equilibrium. An
open question is whether the optimal weights  of the active players are unique up to a positive
scalar factor; i.e., whether relative weights

, ; 2 K(), are uniquely determined by the aim
of eort maximization.
References
[1] J.A. Amegashie: The design of rent-seeking competitions: committees, preliminary and
ﬁnal contests. Public Choice 99, 1999, pp. 63–76.
[2] M.R. Baye, D. Kovenock, and C.G. de Vries: The all-pay auction with complete informa-
tion. Economic Theory 8, 1996, pp. 291–305.
[3] D.J. Clark and C. Riis: Contest success functions: An extension. Economic Theory 11,
1998, pp. 201–204.
[4] R.D. Congleton, K.A. Konrad, and A.L. Hillman (eds.): 40 Years of Research on Rent
Seeking (Vol. 1 and Vol. 2). Springer, 2008.
[5] R. Cornes and R. Hartley: Asymmetric contests with general technologies. Economic The-
ory 26, 2005, pp. 923–946.
[6] A. Dasgupta and K.O. Nti: Designing an optimal contest. European Journal of Political
Economy 14, 1998, pp. 587–603.
[7] S. Dempe: Foundations of Bilevel Programming. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht,
The Netherlands, 2002.
[8] M. Gradstein and K. Konrad: Orchestrating rent seeking contests. Economic Journal 109
(458), 1999, 536–545.
21[9] K.A. Konrad: Strategy and Dynamics in Contests. Oxford University Press, 2009.
[10] Z.-Q. Luo, J.-S. Pang, and D. Ralph: Mathematical Programs with Equilibrium Con-
straints. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England, 1996.
[11] K.O. Nti: Rent-seeking with asymmetric valuations. Public Choice 98, 1999, pp. 415–430.
[12] K.O. Nti: Maximum eorts in contests with asymmetric valuations. European Journal of
Political Economy 20, 2004, pp. 1059–1066.
[13] J.V. Outrata: On optimization problems with variational inequality constraints. SIAM
Journal on Optimization 4, 1994, pp. 340–357.
[14] J.V. Outrata, M. Kocvara, and J. Zowe: Nonsmooth Approach to Optimization Problems
with Equilibrium Constraints. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, The Netherlands,
2002.
[15] S. Skaperdas: Contest success functions. Economic Theory 7, 1996, pp. 283–290.
[16] W.E. Stein: Asymmetric rent-seeking with more than two contestants. Public Choice 113,
2002, pp. 325–336.
[17] F. Szidarovsky and K. Okuguchi: On the existence and uniqueness of pure Nash equilib-
rium in rent-seeking games. Games and Economic Behavior 18, 1997, pp. 135–140.
[18] G. Tullock: Ecient rent seeking. In J. Buchanan, R. Tollison, and G. Tullock (eds.):
Towards a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society. A & M University Press, 1980, pp. 97-112.
A Proof of Theorem 3.4
Here we give a proof of Theorem 3.4 which is the central existence result from Section 3. In
particular, we have to show that the function f : A ! R from (5) has a continuous extension




> > : 2 [0;1)
n







To this end, we ﬁrst recall the deﬁnition of the index set
J() := f 2 N j  = 0g
for a given  2 [0;1)n. We already know from Theorem 3.3 that f is a continuous function on A,
i.e. f is continuous at any point  2 ¯ A such that jJ()j = 0. In a ﬁrst step, we will show in Lemma
A.1 that f has a continuous extension to all  2 ¯ A with jJ()j  n   2. Then, we will prove in
Lemma A.2 that f can also be extended continuously to all points  2 ¯ A such that jJ()j = n   1
by deﬁning f() := 0 in these points. Since the case jJ()j = n cannot occur for  2 ¯ A, this
yields Theorem 3.4.
Here is our ﬁrst result regarding the extension of f to points  with jJ()j  n   2.
22Lemma A.1 The function f, viewed as a mapping from A to R, can be extended continuously
onto the set
f 2 ¯ A j jJ()j  n   2g:
Proof. Recall from the proof of Theorem 3.3 that f is continuous on the set
A = f 2 ¯ A j jJ()j = 0g
(in fact, it is continuous on (0;1)n). Now, let  2 ¯ A with jJ()j 2 f1;:::;n   2g be arbitrarily
given. Then let us deﬁne the set of players N := NnJ(). Since we have jNj  2, it follows
that the Nash game with the set of players N replacing the set of players N has all the properties







be the objective function of this new game, we, in particular, obtain from Theorem 3.3 that f 
is continuous in a suciently small neighbourhood of  simply since we eliminated the critical
players  with 
 = 0 from the set N. We will show in the next paragraph that, for all  from a
suciently small neighbourhood U of , we have K()  N. This then implies f() = f ()
for all  2 U and, in this way, we obtain the desired continuous extension of f in .
To verify the above claim, we have to ﬁnd a suciently small neighbourhood U of  such
that K()  N for all  2 U, i.e., for all  2 U and all indices  with  2 K(), we necessarily
have  > 0. By contraposition, this is equivalent to showing that, for all  2 U and all indices 
with  = 0, we have  < K().
To see this, we ﬁrst choose a suciently small neighbourhood of  such that jJ()j 2
f0;1;:::;n 2g for all  2 U. We then deﬁne a function c() on U as the sum of the two smallest
quotients

 ( 2 N). Then c() is continuous and ﬁnite. Moreover, Corollary 2.4 shows that we
always have K()  f 2 N j

 < c()g. By taking a possibly smaller neighbourhood U, we may
assume by continuity that c() < 2c() for all  2 U and, in addition, that

 > 2c() for all
 2 J(). This implies the desired claim since, now, we obtain

 > 2c() > c() for all  2 U
and all  2 J(), hence  < K(). 
It remains to consider the case jJ()j = n   1. This is done in the following result.
Lemma A.2 The function f, viewed as a mapping from f 2 ¯ A j jJ()j  n   2g to R, can be
extended continuously onto the set ¯ A by setting f() = 0 for all  2 ¯ A with jJ()j = n   1.
Proof. We begin with some preliminary comments. In order to verify our claim, we have to
show that, given an arbitrary vector  2 ¯ A with jJ()j = n   1 as well as a sequence fg ! 
with  2 ¯ A satisfying jJ()j  n   2 for all , we have f() ! f(). Now, for all  2 A (so all






23of our objective function, where K() is the set of active players, cf. (5). On the other hand, if
one or more (at most n   2) components of  are equal to zero, we obtained f by a continuous
extension in the proof of Lemma A.1, hence the representation (15) does not necessarily hold in
this case. However, we showed in the proof of Lemma A.1 that K() \ J() = ; so that players
 with  = 0 are certainly not active. This means that for all  2 ¯ A with jJ()j  n   2, the
representation (15) is still valid, and we will work with it throughout this proof.
Now, take an arbitrary  2 ¯ A with jJ()j = n   1, i.e.  = ej for some j 2 f1;:::;ng. Then
we obtain for all  2 ¯ Anfg suciently close to  that, on the one hand, jJ()j 2 f0;:::;n   2g








hence j 2 K(). Consider an arbitrary sequence fg  ¯ Anfg with  ! . We can divide the
sequence into ﬁnitely many subsequences such that, within each subsequence, the set K() is
constant. We verify the statement for each of these subsequences which then, obviously, implies
that the statement holds for the entire sequence. We now consider one of these subsequences and
call it, once again, fg. In view of the previous remark, we have K()  K and k()  k for all .
We now veriﬁy the limit f() =
P
2K x() ! 0 by showing that x() ! 0 holds for all  2 K.

















! (1   0)0 = 0:



















It therefore remains to verify x() ! 0 for all  2 Knfjg in the case k  3. To this end, we show



































and therefore the desired statement. To verify (16), it suces to show that, for all k = 3;4;:::









24Exchanging the roles of  and  then yields (16).
To verify (17), we ﬁrst consider the case k = 3. Therefore, let ; 2 Knfjg be given with








































Taking into account  ! ej, we obtain (17).
Next, consider the case k = 4. To this end, choose arbitrary ; 2 Knfjg with  , , and let








































































as above, so that  ! ej also yields (17) for the case k = 4. For k = 5;6;:::, the statement can
be veriﬁed in an analogous way. 
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